

DELCY RODRÍGUEZ

Shielded
for the
Post-Maduro
Era



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Delcy Rodríguez: Acting Ruler after Maduro's Capture

Delcy Rodríguez took over the Executive Branch in the post-Maduro era, while her brother Jorge Rodríguez remained in charge of the Legislature. The duo attained epic status as they racked up public offices.

This report shows Delcy Rodríguez's power over the institutional structure of the state, as well as in the private sector. The current acting president of Venezuela has climbed the political ladder to gain control over a large part of the financial, commercial, energy, diplomatic, political, and production sectors, weaving strategic networks and managing various economic sectors along with allies and cronies.

How much power has this woman built up, as one of Nicolás Maduro's main allies after Chávez's death? Did she and her brother consolidate a structure so solid that it can endure in post-Maduro Venezuela and sideline other power players?

Since 2013, she has been climbing the ranks, building relationships, consolidating ties and businesses, always alongside his brother, Jorge Rodríguez, a key figure in what some are starting to call "Rodríguesmo."

Two weeks after Nicolás Maduro and his wife Cilia Flores were captured in a U.S. military operation in Caracas—and kept in jail by order of the Southern District Court of New York¹—Delcy Rodríguez still holds the following public offices:

- Acting President of Venezuela
- Executive Vice President
- Minister of Hydrocarbons
- Chair of the Russia-Venezuela High-Level Intergovernmental Commission (since 2024)
- Chair of the China-Venezuela High-Level Joint Commission (since 2023)

Each position she holds carries strategic responsibilities in Venezuela, as shown below:

¹ Transparencia Venezuela. Los 6 motivos de la acusación contra a Maduro y su esposa en EEUU.

Available at: <https://transparenciave.org/los-6-motivos-de-la-acusacion-contra-a-maduro-y-su-esposa-en-eeuu/> 12 January 2026

THE 5 POSITIONS CURRENTLY HELD BY DELCY RODRÍGUEZ

Executive Vice President

Foundation for Hospital Buildings and Equipment
Gran Misión Barrio Nuevo Barrio Tricolor Foundation (Housing)
Misión Nevado Foundation (Animal Protection)
Fundación Patria (Wage Subsidies)
Fundación Misión Venezuela Bella (Renovation of Public Spaces)
Coordinated Air Transport Service of the Executive Branch (SATA)
International Center for Productive Investment*
National Procurement Service
Autonomous Service of Registries and Notaries (SAREN)*

Close associate:
Abel Durán Gómez, Director-General of SAREN
and first cousin of Delcy and Jorge Rodríguez.

Bolivarian National Intelligence Service (SEBIN)*
National Internal Audit Superintendacy (SUNAI)

2018



* International Center for Productive Investment: Attract and promote national and international investment. 2018

* Autonomous Service of Registries and Notaries (SAREN): Controls the registration of real estate and commercial deeds, including the authentication of documents (powers of attorney, sales, and incorporation of companies, among others).

* Bolivarian National Intelligence Service (SEBIN): law-enforcement agency accused of torture and cruel and inhuman treatment.

Minister of Hydrocarbons

2024



Controls 111 companies: 65 in Venezuela and 46 abroad (It does not control PDV Holding Inc. owner of Citgo Petroleum Corporation).

The most important companies include:

- Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA)*



Close associate:
Héctor Obregón, president of PDVSA.

- Corporación Venezolana de Petróleo, (CVP)*
- Petroquímica de Venezuela, S.A. (Pequiven)*



Close associate:
Román Maniglia, presidente de Pequiven.

- Venezuelan Institute for Scientific Oil Research (Intevep)
- Pdvsa Gas*
- PDV Marina*

* PDVSA: main source of foreign exchange and one of the largest sources of revenue for the national budget.

* Petroquímica de Venezuela, S.A. (Pequiven). Subsidiary of PDVSA. Produces and markets essential petrochemical products.

* Corporación Venezolana de Petróleo, (CVP): Oversees PDVSA's operations and business dealings with private and state-owned companies, both domestic and international.

* Pdvsa Gas: Subsidiary of PDVSA. Controls the exploration, exploitation, processing, and distribution of natural gas in Venezuela.

* PDV Marina: PDVSA subsidiary responsible for maritime and river transport of hydrocarbons (crude oil and by-products)

2026

Acting President

Office of the Presidency and Monitoring of Government Management *
Close associate: Captain **Juan Escalona**, Minister



- National Council for Persons with Disabilities (Conapdis)
- Pueblo Soberano Foundation
- José Félix Ribas Foundation
 - Simón Bolívar Musical Foundation
 - Teresa Carreño Theater Foundation
 - Pro-Patria 2000 Foundation
 - Mission Negra Hipólita Foundation
 - El Niño Simón National Foundation
 - National Center for Historical Studies Foundation
 - César Rengifo National Theater Movement Foundation for Children and Young People
 - Fundación Misión José Gregorio Hernández
 - Institute for Advanced Studies on the Thought of Supreme Commander Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías
- National Anti-Corruption Agency
- Movement for Peace and Life Foundation
- New Frontier of Peace Socialist Mission Foundation
- Negro Primero Fund
- Commander Félix Antonio Velásquez" Bolivarian Revolutionary Movement Foundation of the General Active Reserve
- "Robert Serra" Misión Jóvenes de la Patria Foundation
- Radio Miraflores Foundation
- Simón Bolívar Study Center Foundation
- Autonomous Institute National Council for the Rights of Children and Adolescents
- Autonomous Service National Fund for the Protection of Children and Adolescents
- National Institute of Social Services
- Presidential Office for Plans and Special Projects Foundation



Close associate:
Gustavo González López,
Commander of the Presidential Guard of Honor



China-Venezuela High Level Commission
At least since 2023



At lease since 2024

DELCY RODRÍGUEZ'S ALLIES IN KEY AGENCIES AND ORGANIZATIONS



SECTORAL VICE PRESIDENCY FOR THE ECONOMY

Close associate:



Calixto Ortega Sánchez
Sectoral Vice President

- Sectoral Vice Presidency for the Economy: Coordinates the country's economic, productive, and financial policies under the purview of the ministries related to:
Banking and finance
Industry and commerce
Foreign trade and international investment
Productive agriculture and land
Urban agriculture
Food
Tourism
Oil and mining development
Ecological fishing and aquaculture

The National Superintendency of Crypto Assets and Related Activities (SUNACRIP) reports to the vice presidency.

- **National Superintendency of Crypto Assets and Related Activities (SUNACRIP)**

Close associates:



Anabel Pereira



Héctor Obregón

MINISTRY OF ECONOMY AND FINANCE

Close associate:



Anabel Pereira
Minister

- National Development Fund, S.A. (FONDEN)
- Economic and Social Development Bank (BANDES)
- Bicentenaria Public Stock Exchange
- Superintendence of Banking Sector Institutions (SUDEBAN)
- National Integrated Customs and Tax Administration Service (SENIAT)
- Autonomous Social Benefits Service of Central Government Agencies
- National Securities Superintendency
- Public Assets Superintendency
- Social Protection Fund for Bank Deposits (Fogade)
- National Fund for Entrepreneurship
- Social Security Superintendency
- Autonomous Service for National Lottery Commission
- Insurance Activity Superintendency
- National Savings Fund for the Working Class
- Banco del Tesoro, C.A.
- Banco de Venezuela, C.A.
- Banco Digital de los Trabajadores (formerly Banco Bicentenario).

MINISTRY OF ECOLOGICAL MINING DEVELOPMENT

Close associate:

- Compañía General de Minería de Venezuela, C.A. (Minerven)



Héctor Silva Hernández
Minister and President of Minerven

- Corporación Venezolana de Minería (CVM).



Rodolfo Marco Torres
President of CVM

- Al Quds, S.A.
- Biet Lahem S.A.
- Carabobo Oro C.A.
- Carbones del Suroeste, C.A. (Carbosuroeste)
- Carbones del Zulia, S.A. (Carbozulia)
- CVM Loma de Níquel
- Empresa de Producción Social Minera Nacional, C.A.
- Empresa Mixta Ecosocialista Siembra Minera, S.A.
- Empresa Mixta Minera Ecosocialista Oro Azul, S.A.
- Empresa Mixta Minera Ecosocialista Parguaza, S.A.
- Empresa Nacional Aurífera, S.A. (ENA)
- Fosfatos del Suroeste, C.A. (Fosfasuroeste)
- Instituto Nacional de Geología y Minería (Ingeomin)
- Fundación Misión Piar
- Servicio Nacional de Fiscalización e Inspección Minera (Senafim)

CENTRAL BANK OF VENEZUELA (BCV)

Close associate: Directors



**Luis Alberto
Pérez González**



Calixto Ortega
Expresidente del BCV



**Carlos Cestari
Infantini**




**Santiago
Lazo Ortega**



**Anabel
Pereira**



**Christiam
Hernández
Verdecanna**



**Christian
Martell Ramírez**

NATIONAL ELECTORAL COUNCIL



**Carlos
Quintero
Cuevas**
Rector



**Guillermo
San Agustín**
Owner
of Ex Cle

Disavowed by Chávez, but under Maduro's Wing

Delcy Rodríguez rose to the elite ranks of the so-called Bolivarian Revolution in 2003, as assistant to the then foreign minister, Roy Chaderton, and also assistant to the then minister of communication, Nora Uribe.² That year, her brother was the president of the National Electoral Council (CNE), which provided the technical equipment and logistics for the 2004 recall referendum against Hugo Chávez, of course acting in favor of the president.³

Under Hugo Chávez, Delcy Rodríguez was Director of International Affairs at the Ministry of Energy and Mines and then Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs for Europe in 2005, when her brother Jorge was President of the National Electoral Council.

Hugo Chávez reportedly removed her from his inner circle due to tense relations and after a personal altercation between the two. Her closest position to Chávez was as Minister of the Office of the Presidency for a five-month tenure, between February 23 and August 4, 2006.⁴ Her brother was unable to keep her close to the so-called “Comandante,” although he did appoint her as general coordinator of the Vice Presidency of Venezuela when Jorge Rodríguez was Vice President between 2007 and 2008.

After Chávez’s death in 2013, Delcy Rodríguez rose to positions of power with the support of Nicolás Maduro.



2013-2014	2015-2017	2014-2017	2017-2018	2018-2026	2020-2024	2024-2026
Minister of Communication and Information	Director of International Affairs and Internal Director of PDVSA	Minister of Foreign Affairs	President of the National Constituent Assembly	Vice President of Venezuela	Minister of Economy, Finance, and Foreign Trade	Minister of Hydrocarbons

2 Diario VEA. Siempre con la Revolución: Los primeros cargos políticos de Delcy Rodríguez en la época de Chávez. <https://diariovea.com.ve/siempre-con-la-revolucion-los-primeros-cargos-politicos-de-delcy-rodriguez-en-la-epoca-de-chavez/> 7 February 2024.

3 El País. Jorge Rodríguez, el psiquiatra frío que espera su turno para suceder a Nicolás Maduro. <https://web.archive.org/web/20240415043611/https://elpais.com/america/2024-04-15/jorge-rodriguez-el-psiquiatra-frío-que-espera-su-turno-para-suceder-a-nicolás-maduro.html#> 15 de abril de 2024.

4 El Estímulo. Delcy Rodríguez, del ostracismo con Chávez a la cima del poder con Maduro. Available at: <https://elestimulo.com/venezuela/2017-08-11/delcy-rodriguez-del-ostracismo-con-chavez-a-la-cima-del-poder-con-maduro/>. 11 August 2017.

5 On several occasions, Delcy Rodríguez has held more than one position simultaneously, a common–unconstitutional–practice in Venezuela over the last fifteen years.

Sanctioned, but not indicted, and no reward for her arrest

Delcy Rodríguez was sanctioned by Canada in 2017, and by the United States, Switzerland, the European Union, and the Mexican Senate in 2018, while Colombia banned her from entering the country in 2019. Rodríguez has been accused of undermining democracy, but not of any case of corruption. To date, there is no knowledge of any formal criminal charges brought against her in international courts.

Her name has come up, however, in several cases in the United States and Spain.

United States



DEA Investigations.

U.S. news agency Associated Press (AP) reported on January 17 that it had access to documents indicating that Delcy Rodríguez has been under investigation since 2018 by the DEA (Drug Enforcement Administration) for her alleged links to drug trafficking and has been designated a “priority target” since 2022, also linking her to gold trafficking. There are reportedly at least a dozen investigations involving activities in Paraguay, Ecuador, and the United States. It should be noted that this designation does not mean that there is a criminal charge filed against her.⁶

The AP report noted that an informant told the DEA in early 2021 that Delcy Rodríguez used hotels on Margarita Island (Nueva Esparta state) “as a front for money laundering.” The island has reportedly been under U.S. scrutiny because it is believed to be a strategic hub for drug trafficking routes to the Caribbean and Europe, where several drug traffickers have been captured because it has been a refuge for many, including Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán, former head of the Sinaloa Cartel.

DEA records also show that they are investigating corrupt businesses linked to the Venezuelan government and Omar Nassif-Sruji, brother of Delcy Rodríguez’s long-time partner Yussef Nassif.

⁶ AP. AP obtains documents showing Venezuelan leader Delcy Rodríguez has been on DEA's radar for years. Available at: <https://apnews.com/article/delcy-rodriguez-donald-trump-venezuela-drugs-maduro-70ffbe17378fe0fa9b7f12a40e07b2f3> 17 January 2026

PDV USA / David Rivera Case

Delcy Rodríguez has been named in a criminal indictment against U.S. Representative David Rivera in a Southern District of Florida court on November 16, 2022, for violating U.S. laws requiring him to report to federal authorities that he represented foreign interests.⁷

As Delcy Rodríguez was vice president of International Affairs at PDVSA, internal director of the oil company, and at the same time foreign minister, she ordered Citgo—through its subsidiary PDV USA—to sign in 2017 a contract with David Rivera’s company Interamerican Consulting for USD 50 million for its good offices with Donald Trump to ease sanctions during his first term.

The indictment states that Rodríguez met with Rivera in New York on April 2, 2017. It also mentions businessman Raúl Gorrín,⁸ who is a fugitive from U.S. justice, as an intermediary. Rivera was arrested in December 2022 and released on bail.⁹ No verdict has yet been reached in this case.

Spain



2019

- The judge presiding over Court 41 in Madrid, Juan Carlos Peinado, opened a major money laundering case against senior officials of Nicolás Maduro and Hugo Chávez, investigating more than 70 contracts signed by PDVSA with companies involved in the scheme, some of which are linked to Delcy Rodríguez, to exploit oil fields and then sell the crude oil to Europe.¹⁰
- In Spain, money from these businesses was allegedly laundered through a financial scheme involving accounts in various banks, the acquisition of real estate, and investment in companies linked to the scheme, which were involved in sectors such as real estate and industry, among others.

7 Southern District of Florida Court. Indictment: <https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.flsd.623856/gov.uscourts.flsd.623856.3.0.pdf>

8 Transparencia Venezuela. La Fortuna de Raúl Gorrín a la sombra del poder en Venezuela.

Available at: <https://transparenciave.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/FINAL-INFORME-LA-FORTUNA-DE-RAUL-GORRIN.pdf>

9 Nuevo Herald. Arrestado ex legislador Rivera trabajaba en secreto para Maduro, dice acusación.

<https://www.elnuevoherald.com/noticias/america-latina/venezuela-es/article269681841.html> 7 December 2022.

10 Un juez español investiga a medio gobierno de Maduro por lavar dinero del petróleo. El Confidencial. 20 de abril de 2019.

Available at: https://www.elconfidencial.com/espana/2019-04-20/juez-espanol-investiga-gobierno-maduro-blanquear-dinero-petroleo_1945158/

Statements have been taken from several individuals under investigation, including **Luis Carlos de León**, then chief financial officer of Electricidad de Caracas, and **Nervis Villalobos**, former deputy minister of Energy and a close associate of Rodríguez. Both have also been investigated in the United States.



2021

Nervis Villalobos

Luis Carlos de León

Political organization Vox and trade union Manos Limpias filed a complaint with Madrid's Court of First Instance No. 15 on April 8, 2021, for alleged wrongdoings in the financial aid provided to the airline Plus Ultra due to suspicions of embezzlement of public funds and malfeasance in the granting of the €53,000,000 bailout to the airline.

According to the action filed, the airline had a minimal market share and only one operational aircraft, and thus, it was not “strategic” for Spain, and the bailout only meant maintaining a secure channel of transport and capital for PDVSA contractors and the President’s closest cronies. This case has been closed since January 5, 2023.¹¹

The case allegedly involves a plot of political influence with Venezuela, in which then-Vice President Delcy Rodríguez and former Spanish Minister José Luis Ábalos were mentioned after their controversial meeting at Barajas Airport in Madrid. The case also mentions the alleged mediation of former president José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero to favor Venezuelan partners Rodolfo Reyes Rojas and Raif El Arigie, shareholders of the company.¹²

¹¹ El País. La jueza archiva el caso por el rescate de Plus Ultra.

Available at: <https://elpais.com/economia/2023-01-09/la-jueza-archiva-el-caso-por-el-rescate-de-plus-ultra.html> 9 January 2023.

¹² Armando.Info. El equipaje no declarado de Plus Ultra.

Available at: <https://armando.info/el-equipaje-no-declarado-de-plus-ultra/?tztc=1> 18 December 2022

2023

Spain's National Court is investigating alleged illegal kickbacks, influence peddling, and wrongful government contracts related to the purchase of medical supplies during the COVID-19 pandemic.¹³ Persons of interest include former Transport Minister José Luis Ábalos, his advisor Koldo García, and businessman Víctor De Aldama. Delcy Rodríguez is not formally under investigation as a defendant in the Koldo case, but part of the case mentions Rodríguez's trip to Madrid in 2020 and how her reception was handled.

In addition to the case involving the purchase and sale of medical supplies during the pandemic—with markups of up to 600%—other alleged illegal transactions by Spanish officials came to light, such as the alleged purchase of 104 gold bars negotiated with Delcy Rodríguez during a visit she made to Madrid, even though she was sanctioned and banned by the European Union from entering the Schengen area.¹⁴

¹³ Diario Las Américas. Justicia española mantiene acusación contra el PSOE en el caso Koldo que implica a Delcy Rodríguez. Available at: <https://www.diariolasamericas.com/mundo/justicia-espanola-mantiene-acusacion-contra-el-psoe-el-caso-koldo-que-implica-del-cy-rodriguez-n5371280> 14 February 2025.

¹⁴ El Independiente. Tráfico de drogas, blanqueo y el petróleo venezolano: los lazos judiciales del régimen de Maduro con España. 8 January 2026. Available at: <https://www.elindependiente.com/espana/2026/01/08/trafico-drogas-blanqueo-petroleo-venezolano-lazos-judiciales-regimen-maduro-espana/>

Power in Foreign Affairs (2014-2017)



Delcy Rodríguez joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs when her brother, Jorge Rodríguez, was mayor of Caracas and a leader of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV).

She was Venezuela's first female foreign minister and during her tenure she displayed a confrontational style in international forums, such as the altercation in 2015 at the 49th Mercosur Summit, when Argentina's then-President Mauricio Macri called for the "release of political prisoners in Venezuela"; or when she tried to enter a Mercosur meeting in 2016 after Venezuela was suspended for "disrupting the democratic order,"

according to Mercosur's founding members, for failing to comply with trade, political, and human rights commitments. Also, her accusations in 2016 against Luis Almagro, then secretary general of the OAS, for allegedly leading a strategy of intervention in Venezuela.

In that role, Rodríguez has been very active in diplomatic exchanges with China and Russia. Also as foreign minister, and later as Vice President, she attempted to attract U.S. investment to Venezuela during Donald Trump's first term by ordering PDVSA—through Citgo Petroleum Corporation—to donate \$500,000 to the president's inauguration ceremony, ten days before the event, on December 22, 2016. Press reports indicated that this donation from the Venezuelan government was twice as much as those from Google and Pepsi, and matched the amount donated by JP Morgan Chase and Exxon.¹⁵

Delcy Rodríguez also consolidated nepotism in the Foreign Ministry. An investigation by Transparencia Venezuela at the time revealed that relatives of parliamentarians and other leaders were appointed in most cases without having the expertise to take on those roles.¹⁶

¹⁵ BBC Mundo. Citgo, la filial de la empresa petrolera estatal de Venezuela PDVSA, aportó medio millón de dólares a la ceremonia de investidura de Donald Trump. Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-39647952> 20 April 2017.

¹⁶ Transparencia Venezuela. La familia roja se adueña de la Casa Amarilla. <https://transparenciave.org/project/la-familia-roja-se-adueña-de-casa-amarilla/>

The staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs back then was as follows:

MINISTRY STAFF		
Officer	Diplomatic Post	Family relation / Political experience
Rolando Corao	Chief of Staff	Husband of Jacqueline Faria (board of PSUV/then president of Movilnet)
Andrea Gabriela Corao Faria	Director General, Office of the Deputy Minister for Europe	Daughter of Jacqueline Faria and Rolando Corao
Calixto Ortega Sánchez	Consul in New York	Nephew of Calixto Ortega Ríos (then Justice of the Supreme Court of Justice/former deputy to the NA)
Rosalba Gil Pacheco	Consul in Boston	Wife of Darío Vivas (then Deputy to the NA for PSUV)
Yadira Russián	Consul in Porto	Daughter of Clodosbaldo Russián (former Comptroller General)
María Gabriela Mendoza Istúriz	Consular Chief in Switzerland	Niece of Aristóbulo Istúriz (former Vice President)
Jordana Emilia Ramírez Santos	Consul in Madrid	Daughter of Desirée Santos Amaral (former minister/Editor of Correo del Orinoco)
Sergio Ramón Arias Cárdenas	Consul in Cúcuta	Brother of Francisco Arias Cárdenas (former governor of Zulia)
Jesús Javier Arias Fuenmayor	Ambassador in Costa Rica	Son of Francisco Arias Cárdenas
Glenna Cabello	Minister Counselor in France	Sister of Diosdado Cabello (1st Vice President of PSUV)
Haifa Aissami	Head of Delegation in the Netherlands	Sister of Tareck El Aissami (then governor of Aragua)
Rebeca Ortega Suárez	Consul in Hamburg	Niece of Luisa Ortega Díaz (then Prosecutor General)

Funcionario	Cargo diplomático	Vínculo familiar / Trayectoria política
Laura Medina	Minister Counselor in Germany	Daughter of Alí Rodríguez Araque (former Foreign Affairs Minister / former president of PDVSA/Unasur)
María Marcela Khan Fernández	Minister Conselor in Rome	Sister of José “Chino” Khan (BCV/Cadivi/former minister)
Sofía Teresita Maniglia Meléndez	Delegate at Unesco (Paris)	Daughter of Admirals Orlando Maniglia and Carmen Meléndez (both former ministers of Defense)
Julio Ramón Chirino	Ambassador to Uruguay	Son of Julio Marcelino Chirino (then Consul in Havana)
Carla Isea Saavedra	Consul in Bilbao	Daughter of Mario Isea (then Ambassador to Spain)
Ricardo Capella	Consul in Barcelona, Spain	Brother of Roger Capella (former minister of Health)

During Delcy Rodríguez's tenure as Minister of Foreign Affairs, there was evidence of embassies being used as final posts for former ministers and former deputies of the ruling party:

Former PSUV deputies to the NA:

- **Alfredo Murga** (Paraguay)
- **Hayden Pirela** (Dominica)
- **Filinto Durán** (Honduras)
- **José Francisco Javier Arrúe** (Nicaragua)
- **Alberto Castellar** (Brazil)
- **Imad Saab Saab** (Syria)
- **Mario Isea** (Spain)

Former ministers of Defense:

- **Lucas Rincón** (Portugal)
- **Diego Molero Bellavia** (Peru)

Other high posts:

- **Iván Rincón Urdaneta** (Colombia): former Presiding Justice of the Supreme Court
- **Germán Mundarain** (Vatican City): former Ombudsman.
- **Jesse Chacón Escamillo** (Austria): former minister.
- **Yuri Pimentel** (St. Vincent and the Grenadines): former minister.
- **Iván Zerpa** (China): former secretary of the National Assembly (close to Nicolás Maduro and Cilia Flores)

Power in the economic sector

Delcy Rodríguez, as Vice President of the Republic, wielding control over the Ministry of Economy, Finance, and Foreign Trade, and also as Minister of Hydrocarbons, **managed 40% of the national budget approved in 2024 and 44% of the budget approved for 2025.**

Noteworthy is that, in the cabinet reshuffle following Maduro's capture, and as acting President, Rodríguez removed Álex Saab—who has been pinpointed as Maduro's alleged front man—from his post as Minister of Industries and National Production and announced the merger of that office with that of National Trade, as well as the appointment of the new minister, **Luis Antonio Villegas**. In her recently reactivated account on X (after the senior leadership had stopped posting on that platform), she wrote: “I would also like to thank comrade Álex Saab for his work in the service of the homeland; he will be taking on new responsibilities.”¹⁷

To understand the degree of authority that Delcy Rodríguez has had and continues to have in Venezuela, we will describe the scope of her powers in economic matters.

i. Board of Directors of PDVSA:

Vice President of International Affairs and internal director of the oil company (2015-2017)



Since June 2015, Delcy Rodríguez has been a member of PDVSA's Board of Directors as Vice President of International Affairs and Internal Director..

This position allowed her to exert influence over the state-owned company's international subsidiaries, which at that time totaled more than 50 and were present in nearly 30 countries, as well as over high-level decisions in Venezuela's main industry.

¹⁷ X account of Delcy Rodríguez. <https://x.com/delcyrodriguezv/status/2012328977189269781> 17 January 2026

ii. Vice President of Venezuela



Since June 2018, as Vice President, she has been responsible for these entities, among others:

1. Fundación Patria: an entity that has centralized the payrolls of all government agencies and entities at the three levels of government, as well as the payment of bonuses (subsidies) to civil servants, public sector pensioners, and vulnerable groups.

The money earmarked for the Patria subsidies is not described in the annual budgets. For some allowances, such as *Hogares de la Patria* (for head of households), *Guerra Económica* (for civil servants and pensioners), and *Amor Mayor* (for the elderly), the allocation criteria and frequency were disclosed, while others are transferred irregularly, with undisclosed criteria, and in irregular—usually very low—amounts, never exceeding USD 20. The Patria Foundation has great discretionary power, is opaque, and is not accountable.

2. Three foundations responsible for the construction and maintenance of infrastructure: one for hospital buildings and equipment, *Misión Barrio Nuevo Barrio Tricolor* (housing), and *Misión Venezuela Bella* (for renovation of public spaces).

3. The International Center for Productive Investment (CIIP), created in 2020 with the passing of the Anti-Blockade Law, is devoted to promoting strategic investments with guarantees of absolute confidentiality, expedited administrative procedures, special incentives, schemes to avoid sanctions, and guarantees of return.

Through the CIIP, with **Héctor Silva** at the helm, the nation has seen a rise in cases of covert privatization since 2016, which have favored businesspeople linked to the kleptocratic elite and have exacerbated existing asymmetries in the competitive conditions of multiple economic sectors.

4. The Autonomous Service of Registries and Notaries (SAREN), headed by Abel Durán Gómez, Delcy's first cousin, and Jorge Rodríguez Gómez. This is the body that provides services for registering and/or notarizing documents for the sale of private property and real estate, corporations, sole proprietorships, university degrees, and minutes of meetings for all types of private organizations, among others.

The reforms to its regulations in 2021 and 2022 turned SAREN into yet another instrument for collecting fees to raise the tax burden, in disregard for the principles of neutrality and tax justice. There have been reports of exorbitant and undue charges collected by officials from various SAREN departments in exchange for expediting procedures.¹⁸

iii. Sectoral Vice President for the Economy (2018-2025)



The Sectoral Vice President for the Economy coordinates and exercises functional control over the ministries and agencies with jurisdiction over economic matters, such as:

- Banking and finance
- Industry and commerce
- Foreign trade and international investment
- Productive agriculture and land
- Urban agriculture
- Food
- Tourism
- Oil and ecological mining development
- Fishing and aquaculture

¹⁸ Cedice. Observatory of Public Spending. Available at: <https://cedice.org.ve/ogp/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/Hacia-la-eficiencia-del-gasto-publico-a-traves-del-blockchain-OGP-18.08.22.pdf>

Particularly noteworthy is the National Superintendence of Crypto Assets and Related Activities (SUNACRIP). Until the PDVSA-Crypto plot was uncovered, it was headed by Tareck El Aissami, former Minister of Petroleum, who was arrested for this scheme.¹⁹ Since then, a restructuring commission has been formed, chaired by two people from the Rodríguez family's inner circle: Anabel Pereira Fernández and Héctor Obregón Pérez, who, as of this writing, remain in charge of the crypto system.

- Pereira Fernández has accompanied Delcy Rodríguez during her tenure at the Foreign Ministry, at the Ministry of Economy and Finance as superintendent of Banking Sector Institutions (SUDEBAN) and then as chair of the supervisory board of the National Superintendence of Crypto Assets and Related Activities (SUNACRIP), a position she currently holds in parallel with that of vice president of Commerce and International Supply at PDVSA, minister of Economy and Finance, and director of the Central Bank of Venezuela.
- Sunacrip is in charge of regulating, coordinating, supervising, and overseeing the use, operation, and development of crypto assets and related activities within Venezuela. This includes:
 - The creation, issuance, and organization of crypto assets.
 - The issuance of operating licenses for exchange companies. Only two have been authorized: Crixto Pay and Kontigo App.
 - The establishment of rules for the functioning, operation, and use of exchange platforms and other crypto services.
 - Overseeing compliance with the obligations of individuals and legal entities operating with crypto assets.

Cryptoasset activity in Venezuela has been revived on a large scale since June 2025, with high risks of money laundering, corruption involving exchange rate differentials, and mechanisms for evading sanctions.²⁰

¹⁹ Transparencia Venezuela. PDVSA-Crypto, An Unprecedented Fraud.

Available at: https://transparenciave.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/PDVSA-CRYPTO-An-precedented-Fraud-with-Tremendous-Economic-and-Social-Impact-_OCT2023.pdf 19 October 2023.

²⁰ Transparencia Venezuela. Las criptomonedas: la nueva forma de lavado y corrupción de Venezuela para el mundo. Available at:

<https://transparenciave.org/las-criptomonedas-la-nueva-forma-de-lavado-y-corrupcion-de-venezuela-para-el-mundo/> 31 October 2025

THE SCHEME THAT ENABLES MONEY LAUNDERING WITH CRYPTO



iv. Minister of Economy, Finance, and Foreign Trade (2020-2024)



Rodríguez headed this ministry until 2024, when she handed it over to one of her trusted cronies, **Anabel Pereira Fernández**. This office is responsible for the financial administration of the public sector and for directing fiscal policy, which includes responsibilities for policy formulation and implementation, public sector financial administration, debt management, tax collection, treasury and accounting, and supervision of productive, diversified, and sustainable development, coordinating with other entities on the budget and debt.

This ministry oversees the regulatory bodies for banking, the stock market, insurance, and lotteries, as well as state-owned companies in the financial sector.

When Delcy Rodríguez joined the Ministry of Economy and Finance, she was entrusted with additional duties in foreign trade, which were removed when she left office, and the Ministry of Foreign Trade was created. The bodies attached to this office include the agencies that manage the country's largest funds with total discretion and opacity:

1. **The Economic and Social Development Bank (BANDES)**, which functions as an extrabudgetary fund for large investments and manages bilateral loans such as the Chinese Fund, which received more than USD 50 billion in loans.



2. **The National Development Fund (FONDEN)**, which is the most important extra-budgetary fund since its creation in 2005. FONDEN financed 781 projects, for which it earmarked USD 174.898 billion between 2005 and 2015.²¹ Although it was included in the budget in 2019, its funds continue to be managed secretly. In the 2024 National Budget Law,²² it was allocated 32% of the total budgeted amount, and in the 2025 Budget Law,²³ it had 28% of the funds.



3. The main purpose of the **Superintendency of Banking Sector Institutions (SUDEBAN)** is to supervise and oversee financial institutions to ensure the stability of the system and prevent money laundering and terrorist financing. Due to non-compliance in these areas, Venezuela has been included on the gray list of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) since 2024.



²¹ Transparencia Venezuela. Más de USD 174.000 millones comprometió el Fonden en proyectos opacos e inconclusos. Available at: <https://transparenciave.org/mas-de-usd-174-000-millones-comprometio-el-fonden-en-proyectos-opacos-e-inconclusos/>

²² Transparencia Venezuela. Nuestro presupuesto 2024. Available at: https://transparenciave.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Nuestro-Presupuesto-2024_TV.pdf June 2024.

²³ Transparencia Venezuela. Nuestro presupuesto 2025. Available at: <https://transparenciave.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/Analisis-del-Presupuesto-de-Venezuela-2025.-Transparencia-Venezuela.pdf> June 2025.

v. Minister of Hydrocarbons (2024-2026)



In August 2024, Delcy Rodríguez was appointed Minister of Hydrocarbons, but she left Anabel Pereira Fernández at the helm of the Ministry of Economy and Finance, a person she had trusted since she began working as a civil servant in the mayor's office of the Libertador municipality of Caracas in 2012, during the administration of her brother Jorge Rodríguez.

With Delcy Rodríguez at the Ministry of Hydrocarbons, the following were also assigned posts at PDVSA:



Anabel Pereira Fernández, as Vice President of Trade and International Supply since September 2025.²⁴



Héctor Obregón Pérez, who accompanied Delcy Rodríguez in the Ministry of Economy as president of Bandes, then as a member of the Sunacrip Restructuring Commission after the PDVSA-Crypto plot was uncovered, and finally as president of the main oil company, PDVSA.



Gustavo González López, former director of the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service (SEBIN), who joined PDVSA as superintendent of Strategic Affairs and Production Control, a high-level position created for him. His closeness to Delcy Rodríguez became evident when, on January 7, 2026, he was appointed commander of the Presidential Guard of Honor, in the context of power shifts after Rodríguez took office as interim president.

²⁴ Official Gazette No. 43.213, dated December 15.

The Ministry of Hydrocarbons controls at least 111 companies in the sector, 65 based in Venezuela and 46 internationally. It should be noted that PDV Holding Inc., owner of Citgo Petroleum Corporation, is not under the control of the ministry.

During Delcy Rodríguez's tenure at the ministry, partnerships with the private sector known as Productive Partnership Contracts (CPP) were established for the administration, exploitation, related services, and marketing of oil, to the detriment of PDVSA's interests, without open bidding, without parliamentary oversight, relaxing fiscal obligations, thus impacting public revenues, and in absolute secrecy. Thus, the provisions of the Constitution and the Law on Hydrocarbons were effectively modified.

vi. Participation in managing relations with Russia and China



As foreign minister, Delcy Rodríguez was involved in diplomatic exchanges with Russia and China. Since then, she has actively participated in the cooperation mechanisms the government has set up. Even after being sworn in as acting president, she approached the ambassadors of Russia, China, and Iran before other guests at the National Assembly ceremony.

- I n the case of Russia, she has been chair of the Russia-Venezuela High-Level Intergovernmental Commission (CIAN) since at least 2024. The CIAN has been active since 2004, has held 19 meetings, and is the main communication channel between the two countries. Delcy Rodríguez has participated in at least 14 high-level meetings with representatives of the Russian government since 2022.

She has also chaired the China-Venezuela High-Level Joint Commission (CMAN) since at least 2023, a mechanism similar to CIAN with Russia. Since 2019, she has participated in at least 11 meetings with Chinese authorities. On January 8, 2026, she held a face-to-face meeting with Ambassador Lan Hu.²⁵

²⁵ Xinhua Español. Delcy Rodríguez se reúne con embajador de China en Venezuela.

Available at: <https://spanish.xinhuanet.com/20260109/c322347e34114104bd3d47c5ef501fd8/c.html> 8 January 2026.

The Rodríguez's Influence in the Judiciary

The tandem formed by **Nicolás Maduro** and his wife, **Cilia Flores**, controlled the Venezuelan justice system. The majority of the judges of the Supreme Court of Justice (TSJ), as well as other judicial institutions such as the Public Defender's Office and the members of the Republican Moral Council (Prosecutor General, Ombudsman, and Comptroller), answered to the couple now imprisoned in New York.

A number of sources maintain that the Maduro-Flores duo did not yield absolute control. Members of the highest court, such as Justice **Fanny Márquez Cordero** and **Juan Carlos Hidalgo Pandares**, have been linked to Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello.

However, the shockwaves caused by the couple's capture by U.S. forces during the unprecedented military operation on January 3, 2026, will surely lead to realignments in the alliances within the judiciary. Until now, the current acting president, Delcy Rodríguez, and her brother, the president of the National Assembly, Jorge Rodríguez, had few allies within the highest court.



There are claims within the Supreme Court that its current presiding Justice, **Caryslia Beatriz Rodríguez Rodríguez**, is on good terms with the temporary Head of State, although many continue to link her to the Maduro-Flores duo. "They both studied at the Central University of Venezuela (UCV) and have known each other since that time," say sources at the highest court.

Caryslia Beatriz Rodríguez's rise through the ranks of the judiciary happened at breakneck speed, as she had

no experience in the judicial system until her appointment as a judge in 2022. She had served as a Caracas city councilor for the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) and as acting mayor of Caracas following the resignation of Érika Farías.

In 2017, she served as an alternate member of the Liquidation Board of the Metropolitan Mayor's Office of Caracas, appointed by the National Constituent Assembly, then chaired by Delcy Rodríguez.

Others also mention the current Presiding Judge of the Constitutional Chamber, Justice Tania D'Amelio, as a figure with connections to both the Maduro-Flores duo and the Rodríguez siblings. Before joining the Supreme Court, D'Amelio spent more than 12 years as rector of the National Electoral Council (CNE), an institution controlled by Jorge Rodríguez after serving as principal rector and president for almost four years.

The Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice appointed Delcy Rodríguez as acting president of Venezuela without setting a time limit and without declaring Nicolás Maduro permanently unable to perform his duties.



Two former senior officials from the Public Prosecutor's Office agreed in pointing to Larry Davoe, current secretary of the Human Rights Council and Venezuela's representative to international organizations, as a figure close to Delcy Rodríguez.

Davoe was legal advisor to the Ombudsman's Office during Gabriela Ramírez's tenure; he then joined the Human Rights Council created by Maduro during the 2014 protests and was also the Venezuela's representative before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.

Delcy Rodríguez and the Dreaded SEBIN

Since 2013, the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service (SEBIN), known as the political police, has been a decentralized body of the Vice Presidency, according to the Regulations published in Official Gazette No. 40,153 on April 24 of that year. The powers of the Vice President as a political authority include: “plan, strengthen, coordinate, and execute civil intelligence and counterintelligence activities in matters of security, defense, and comprehensive development of the country.”²⁶



In June 2018, when Delcy Rodríguez was appointed vice president, General Gustavo González López was head of SEBIN and was relieved of his duties on October 30, 2018, following the death of opposition councilman Fernando Albán²⁷ on October 8 of that year, while in the custody of that security agency.

González López was only out of Nicolás Maduro’s administration for two months. Through a presidential decree,²⁸ he was appointed Security and Intelligence Advisor to the President. In Article 2 of the decree,

Maduro delegated the swearing-in of the military officer to Delcy Rodríguez.

At the time, Manuel Christopher Figuera was head of SEBIN, but after his involvement in the military uprising of April 30, 2019, he was removed, and General Gustavo González López was reappointed to the position.

The duties of SEBIN include identifying and neutralizing internal or external threats, advising the President on security and defense matters, and carrying out intelligence, counterintelligence, and strategic investigations.

Delcy Rodríguez has been a key figure in coordinating actions between SEBIN and strategic sectors such as oil, mining, and electricity, under the premise of protecting the state from alleged internal and external threats.



26 Pandectas Digital. Official Gazette No. 40.153.

https://pandectasdigital.blogspot.com/2017/09/gaceta-oficial-de-la-republica_698.html 24 April 2013.

27 Amnistía Internacional. Un concejal muere bajo custodia del servicio de inteligencia.

<https://www.amnesty.org/es/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2021/05/AMR539222018SPANISH.pdf> 9 October 2018

28 Pandectas Digital. Official Gazette No. 41.558. <https://pandectasdigital.blogspot.com/2019/01/decreto-n-3735-mediante-el-cual-se.html> 7 January 2018

Since the creation of SEBIN in 2010, human rights organizations and international bodies, such as the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Venezuela,²⁹ have reported cases of persecution, torture, enforced disappearances, and arbitrary detentions by SEBIN officers.

After the presidential elections on July 28, 2024, in which the National Electoral Council declared Nicolás Maduro the winner amid allegations of rigging the results, the Chavista government decided to reshuffle its cabinet and appointed **Alexis Rodríguez Cabello** as director of SEBIN and Diosdado Cabello Rondón as Minister of the Interior and Justice. In practice, control over the so-called political police was put back on Cabello's hands.

On October 19, 2024, Gustavo González López was appointed head of Strategic Affairs and Production Control at PDVSA.³⁰ In August of that year, Delcy Rodríguez had been appointed Minister of Petroleum³¹ without relinquishing her position as Vice President.

After being sworn in by her brother as acting president of Venezuela following the arrest of Nicolás Maduro on January 3, 2026, González López was appointed by Delcy Rodríguez as commander of the Presidential Guard of Honor and head of the General Directorate of Military Counterintelligence (DGCIM), which reports directly to the Ministry of Defense and the President of the Republic.

29 United Nations Human Rights Council. Report of the independent international fact-finding mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. <https://www.ohchr.org/es/hr-bodies/hrc/ffmv/report-ffmv-september2022> 20 September 2022 Amnesty International. Detenciones sin órdenes judiciales en Venezuela: silenciados a la fuerza. <https://www.amnistia.org/ve/noticias/2017/04/1939/detenciones-sin-ordenes-judiciales-en-venezuela-silenciadosalafuerza> 26 April 2017.

30 Amnesty International. Venezuela: Enforced disappearances amount to crime against humanity. <https://www.amnestyusa.org/press-releases/venezuela-enforced-disappearances-amount-to-crimes-against-humanity/> 15 July 2025. TalCual. González López pasó de ser el director del Sebin a intendente en Pdvsa. <https://talcualdigital.com/gonzalez-lopez-paso-de-ser-el-director-del-sebin-a-intendente-en-pdvs/> 6 November 2024

31 Swissinfo.ch. Vicepresidenta de Venezuela asume petróleo y poderoso dirigente Cabello, Interior. <https://www.swissinfo.ch/spa/vicepresidenta-de-venezuela-sume-petr%C3%B3leo-y-poderoso-dirigente-cabello%C2-interior/87448630> 27 August 2024.

Allies in Mining

In June 2019, in a broadcast from the Miraflores Palace in Caracas on the mining industry as one of the drivers of the economy, Nicolás Maduro, Delcy Rodríguez as vice president, and Víctor Cano, then Minister of the People's Power for Ecological Mining Development, presented the “National Mining Plan 2019-2025,”³² with an investment of 7.7 billion euros and estimated revenues of 33 billion euros.³³ There is no information, evidence, or indication that this investment took place.



Víctor
Cano

At this meeting, Maduro instructed and tasked Rodríguez and Cano with “monetizing the gold” on international markets. As vice president, Rodríguez was appointed and empowered to oversee and monitor the implementation of the approved mining plan. This responsibility was reinforced with her appointment as minister of Economy and Finance in September 2020.³⁴

Delcy Rodríguez’s control over the mining sector was consolidated with the intervention decree on Corporación Venezolana de Guayana (CVG) on March 31, 2023,³⁵ which appointed Héctor José Silva Hernández as president of the Intervention Board and Alexis Rodríguez Cabello as vice president. The CVG manages the basic industries that process iron, aluminum, bauxite, and other minerals extracted in southern Venezuela. Subsequently, when the board was dissolved on November 5, 2024, Silva Hernández was appointed president of the CVG.

32 BBC News. Delcy Rodríguez destituye al general que estaba a cargo de la seguridad de Maduro. <https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/c74vmgwewero> 7 January 2026

33 Ministry of Ecological Mining Development. Mining Plan 2019-2025. https://www.desarrollominero.gob.ve/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/Plan-Sectorial-Minero2019_2025_Final040619_compressed.pdf

34 Ministry of Culture. Presidente Maduro aprobó el Plan Sectorial Minero 2019-2025. <https://albaciudad.org/2019/06/maduro-plan-sectorial-minero/#:~:text=El%20Presidente%20venezolano%2C%20Nicol%C3%A1s%20Maduro,Ver%20este%20en%C3%ADdeo%20en%20YouTube>. 6 June 2019

34 GHM Abogados. Official Gazette No. 41.960. <https://www.ghm.com.ve/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/41960.pdf> 8 September 2020.

Silva Hernández is currently Minister of Ecological Mining Development and president of Minerven, the state-owned company responsible for gold management with original jurisdiction and concessions in Bolívar state, although its role as a state-owned company implies a relationship with domestic mining policy.³⁶

Silva Hernández's career began as president of the regional company "Miranda Produce" during Héctor Rodríguez's tenure as governor of Miranda for the PSUV. Subsequently, his national profile was consolidated with his appointment on September 16, 2020,³⁷ as president of the Foreign Trade Bank (Bancoex), a state-owned bank attached to the then Ministry of Economy and Finance, headed by Delcy Rodríguez.

On October 12, 2020,³⁸ following the approval of the Anti-Blockade Law presented by Maduro, Silva Hernández was appointed president of the newly created International Center for Productive Investment of Venezuela (CIIP), a public institute attached to the Vice President, whose creation was proposed by Rodríguez herself.

Subsequently, and in parallel, Delcy Rodríguez appointed him as Deputy Minister in charge of Foreign Trade and Investment Promotion at the Ministry of Economy, Finance and Foreign Trade, a position for which Silva Hernández was removed as chairman of Bancoex.⁴⁰ Two years later, on May 31, 2022, he was appointed Deputy Minister of Productive Economy at the same ministry,⁴¹ stepping down from the position of Deputy Minister in charge of Foreign Trade and retaining the presidency of the CIIP.

While Delcy Rodríguez was responsible for implementing the National Mining Plan, in 2020 she appointed **Alejandro Miguel Martínez Herrera** as president of the National Institute of Geology and Mining (Ingeomin),⁴² which is responsible for promoting and executing policies on research, exploration, and management of mineral and geological resources. In 2022, he was ratified in his position by the vice president.

Another official close to Delcy Rodríguez is **Rodolfo Marco Torres**, president of the Venezuelan Mining Corporation since February 2024, a state-owned company responsible for exploring, producing, and marketing Venezuela's valuable mineral resources, with a primary focus on the gold industry.

36 Finanzas Digital. Official Gazette Extraordinary No. 6.741 <https://finanzasdigital.com/gaceta-oficial-extraordinaria-n-6-741/> 31 March 2023.

37 Pandectas Digital. Official Gazette No. 6.814.

https://pandectasdigital.blogspot.com/2024/06/gaceta-oficial-de-la-republica_17.html#google_vignette 17 June 2024.

38 GHM Abogados. Official Gazette No. 41.966. <https://www.ghm.com.ve/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/41966.pdf> 16 September 2020.

39 Pandectas Digital. Incorporation Decree published on Official Gazette Extraordinary No. 6.583.

https://pandectasdigital.blogspot.com/2020/10/gaceta-oficial-de-la-republica_24.html#google_vignette 12 October 2020.

40 Pandectas Digital. Official Gazette Extraordinary No. 6.596.

https://pandectasdigital.blogspot.com/2020/11/gaceta-oficial-de-la-republica_47.html 16 November 2020.

41 Pandectas Digital. Official Gazette No. 42.388.

https://pandectasdigital.blogspot.com/2022/05/gaceta-oficial-de-la-republica_31.html 31 May 2022.

He was National Treasurer, governor of Aragua state, Minister of State for Public Banking, Minister of Food, director of Banco de Venezuela, and Minister of Finance, reflecting the large presence of officials from the financial sector who are now in charge of Venezuela's mining sector, led by and subordinate to Delcy Rodríguez.


Then we have **Calixto Ortega Sánchez**. According to a Transparencia Venezuela report, between 2020 and 2024, the number of strategic alliances forged with different companies to mine, process, and export gold increased.⁴² This was possible thanks to authorizations granted by the Central Bank of Venezuela (BCV), as the body with direct authority over the management and marketing of strategic minerals. During that period, Calixto Ortega Sánchez was at the helm of the BCV. When she was sworn in as acting president, Ortega Sánchez was appointed by Delcy Rodríguez as sectoral vice president of Economy and Finance.

The strategic alliances indirectly linked to Delcy Rodríguez include notably Inversiones Quimiveco. One of its shareholders, **Sebastián Fernández de Caleyá**, is the brother of **Nicolás Fernández de Caleyá**, who is a partner—along with **Jorge Giménez**—in the FUTVE football league.

⁴² Transparencia Venezuela. Gold Mining in Venezuela 2024.

<https://transparenciave.org/economias-ilicitas/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Gold-Mining-in-Venezuela.-Transparencia-Venezuela-en-el-exilio.pdf>
8 April 2025

The National Electoral Council, Rodríguez Territory



Delcy Rodríguez has never formally held a position in the Electoral Branch, but her brother Jorge Rodríguez's tenure as principal rector and president of the National Electoral Council (CNE) for almost 20 years allowed her to build structural influence through political, technological, and data control of the nation's electoral apparatus.

Their main ally is Rector Carlos Quintero Cuevas⁴³ who joined the electoral body in September 2004, while Jorge Rodríguez was the principal rector. Before becoming vice president of the CNE—his current position—Quintero Cuevas managed the Electoral Roll, was in charge of the IT department, and was a member of the National Electoral Board. In other words, he established the voter roll that was used for elections and had access to the data of all components of the electoral system and voting instruments.

Although he was not a principal rector of the electoral council during Tibisay Lucena's tenure, Quintero Cuevas became the second most powerful official in the CNE.

⁴³ El Pitazo. Carlos Quintero: la pieza oculta del engranaje del Consejo Nacional Electoral.

<https://elpitazo.net/politica/carlos-quintero-la-pieza-oculta-del-engranaje-del-consejo-nacional-electoral/> 20 May 2018

Control over electoral processes was consolidated through the relationship between Carlos Quintero and Guillermo San Agustín, owner of the Argentine company Ex-Clé S.A. and its Venezuelan subsidiary Ex-Clé Soluciones Biométricas C.A., which went from being a provider of biometric services for various Venezuelan government agencies⁴⁴ to becoming the sole electoral technology operator following the departure of Smartmatic, a company that denounced there was tampering with data on voter turnout in the 2017 National Constituent Assembly election.⁴⁵

In the presidential elections of July 28, 2024, Ex-Clé, led by Carlos Quintero and the Rodríguez family, witnessed and colluded in electoral fraud, refusing to present the records that would support the results announced by the CNE.⁴⁶

The investigative media outlet Armando.info points out that Ex-Clé is a kind of parallel CNE controlled by Delcy and Jorge Rodríguez,⁴⁷ and that some of the employees of the Argentine company run by Guillermo San Agustín have held positions in government bodies headed by the Rodríguez family.

Ex-Clé staff also includes:

Jorge Renato Nehmer Ibáñez

Operations manager at Ex-Clé since at least 2021. He has been responsible for handling matters related to SAIME (Administrative Service for Identification, Migration, and Foreigners), SAREN (Autonomous Service for Registries and Notaries), and the Civil Registry. According to Official Gazette No. 40.454 dated July 15, 2014,⁴⁸ Nehmer Ibáñez was appointed coordinator of the Management Control System project for the Ministry of Communication and Information by the then minister Delcy Rodríguez. He then became deputy director of technology for the same ministry until, once Delcy Rodríguez became foreign minister, he took a position in the technology department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

⁴⁴ Transparencia Venezuela. Ex-Clé: Testigo del fraude electoral de 2024 en Venezuela.

<https://transparenciave.org/ex-cle-testigo-del-fraude-electoral-de-2024-en-venezuela/> November 2025

⁴⁵ Transparencia Venezuela. Smarmatic versus Ex Clé. La sombra sobre el sistema electoral venezolano.

Available at: <https://transparenciave.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/9-de-octubre-Smartmatic-vs-Ex-cle.pdf> October 2025.

⁴⁶ Transparencia Venezuela. Ex-Clé: Testigo del fraude electoral de 2024 en Venezuela.

<https://transparenciave.org/ex-cle-testigo-del-fraude-electoral-de-2024-en-venezuela/> November 2025

⁴⁷ Armando.info. Cómo privatizar unas elecciones. <https://armando.info/como-privatizar-unas-elecciones/> 18 August 2024

⁴⁸ Pandectas Digital. Official Gazette No. 40.454.

https://pandectasdigital.blogspot.com/2017/10/gaceta-oficial-de-la-republica_438.html 15 July 2014.

Vanessa Sepúlveda Medialdea

She is part of the Banco de Venezuela’s “Biopago” platform, but previously served as Director of Information Technology for the Administrative Services Office of the Ministry of Communication, according to Armando.info. While serving as vice president, Delcy Rodríguez appointed her as alternate director on the board of directors of the state-owned telecommunications company Movilnet, according to Official Gazette No. 41,731 of October 4, 2019.⁴⁹

Erich Javier Briceño Fernández

He has been employed by the CNE for more than 10 years, and in 2017 became project manager at Ex-Clé.

Ángel José and José Ángel Elía Rodríguez

Director of electoral solutions and systems analyst at the CNE, respectively, who were publicly presented as external advisors during the audits.

Richard Hendry Chirino Torres

Former Director of Infrastructure at the CNE who became project manager for electoral solutions at Ex-Clé.

Between 2017 and 2025, Ex-Clé Soluciones Biométricas C.A., under the control of the Rodríguez brothers, organized nine elections,⁵⁰ including parliamentary and presidential elections.

49 GHM Abogados. Official Gazette No. 41.731. <https://www.ghm.com.ve/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/41731.pdf> 4 October 2019

50 Transparencia Venezuela. Ex-Clé: Testigo del fraude electoral de 2024 en Venezuela.

<https://transpareciavenezuela.org/ex-clave-testigo-del-fraude-electoral-de-2024-en-venezuela/> November 2025

Delcy Rodríguez's economic network in the “private sector”

Investigations into the kleptocracy network operating in Venezuela have identified a web between political elites and private actors who, since the pandemic, have invested capital of unknown origin in more than 34 economic sectors, despite the structural economic crisis, the lack of legal certainty, the small size of the market, extortion mechanisms by criminal groups and officials, and the poor quality of basic services. However, when we identified the shareholders and executives of these companies, we found direct links to high-level government officials.

These companies share four or more of these characteristics:

Companies owned by individuals with proven ties to power, either because they are active or retired officials, have family ties, or are members of the PSUV.

Companies whose executives or shareholders have been reported to official bodies in Venezuela or other countries for corruption or similar crimes.

Companies that emerged or experienced significant growth in recent years, despite the economic crisis.


Companies that, although they were created many years ago, recently changed their board of directors or received a significant capital injection that has allowed them to expand.

Companies that received huge amounts of foreign currency amid exchange controls imposed by the government since 2003.

Companies that have signed many or powerful contracts with the Venezuelan government.

Companies that do business exclusively with the government.

COUNTRIES WHERE COMPANIES LINKED TO DELCY RODRIGUEZ ARE REGISTERED



There are approximately 122 individuals involved as members of the boards of directors, partners, legal representatives, attorneys-in-fact, lawyers, or statutory auditors of the companies allegedly linked to the case.

COMPANIES ALLEGEDLY LINKED TO DELCY RODRÍGUEZ

Of the total 141 companies, 85 are in Venezuela and 56 are registered in other countries.



Import and marketing *	31
Construction	15
Energy**	13
Bars, restaurants, clubs	9
Agrofood	6
Media	6
Other sectors	61


**TOTAL
141**

* Marketing of food, textiles and footwear, perfumes and cosmetics, jewelry and costume jewelry, electronics and appliances, import and customs services

**Electricity, hydrocarbons and related services

LOCATION OF COMPANIES ALLEGEDLY LINKED TO DELCY RODRÍGUEZ

**TOTAL
GENERAL
141**



There are 27 companies registered in Panama,
11 in Spain, and 6 in Brazil.

Brothers **Majed Khalil Majzoub** and **Khaled Khalil Majzoub** have been involved in hundreds of opaque contracts in Venezuela which, according to information gathered by the Venezuelan National Registry of Contractors and various investigations published in the media, have been awarded thanks to their relationship with Jorge and Delcy Rodríguez, Diosdado Cabello, and General Francisco Rangel Gómez.

Investigative media outlets have reported that Delcy Rodríguez was romantically involved with Yussef Abou Nassif Smaili, who—along with his relative **Omar Abou Nassif Sruji**—benefited from million-dollar contracts for the Local Supply and Production Committees (CLAP) through the companies Million Rice and *Mass Joy Industries Limited*.⁵¹



Jorge Andrés Giménez Ochoa is considered a key figure in Delcy Rodríguez's network of allies. He is directly involved in 11 companies in various industries, including food, oil, construction, and sports. Giménez manages intermediary companies for the sale of PDVSA crude oil (under the ministerial command of Delcy Rodríguez) and businesses related to CLAP food.⁵²




Camilo Ibrahim Issa, a businessman of Lebanese origin, is known to have a network of companies in Venezuela and other countries such as Spain. He is notable for his links to the Spanish airline Plus Ultra and the Venezuelan coffee brand Páramo.⁵³ According to media reports, his empire also includes companies that offer oil services. The investigative media outlet Armando.info points out that during the Chavez era, Ibrahim Issa had access to preferential foreign currency and contracts with the Venezuelan state for the expansion of his businesses.

51 Armando.info. La familia, mercantil antes que política, de Delcy Rodríguez. Available at: <https://armando.info/la-familia-mercantil-antes-que-politica-de-delcy-rodriguez/> 15 August 2021.

52 Transparencia Venezuela. El fútbol venezolano entre un poderoso «ahijado» y varios padrinos. <https://transparenciave.org/el-futbol-venezolano-entre-un-poderoso-ahijado-y-varios-padrinos/> 25 May 2025

53 Armando.info. «En Venezuela Juan Valdez se llamaría Camilo Ibrahim». Available at: <https://armando.info/en-venezuela-juan-valdez-se-llamaría-camilo-ibrahim/> 28 May 2021

Rodríguez also “plays” in sports



Delcy Rodríguez, as Venezuela’s Vice President and Minister of Petroleum (Hydrocarbons), has exerted significant influence on Maduro’s strategy known as sportswashing, used to clean up the government’s reputation by replacing traditional sports management with opaque structures formed by private individuals and government officials.

This practice negatively impacts the development of local sporting talent, weakens the independence of national federations, and compromises the integrity of sports. A prime example is the use of “El Helicoide,” one of the headquarters of the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service (SEBIN), a detention and torture center, which doubles as the venue for games of the so-called Basketball Super League.

Delcy Rodríguez is said to have a particular involvement in football (soccer), with a network of close allies, mainly through the Venezuelan Soccer Federation (FVF) and the FUTVE League, where her associates manage both the sports management and some other businesses.

The following list of individuals summarizes Delcy Rodríguez’s connections in the field of sports.



Pedro Infante

He has been the first vice president of the Venezuelan Football Federation (FVF) since 2021. He has held high political office as first vice president of the National Assembly and vice president of the ruling party, PSUV. Infante is part of the Rodríguez family's inner circle. These political ties undermine the independence required by FIFA, the world governing body of soccer.⁵⁴



Jorge Andrés Giménez Ochoa

As of 2026, he is the president of the Venezuelan Football Federation (FVF) and is considered a close "protégé" of the current president of Venezuela. He had no known previous experience in Venezuelan football and was the owner of Deportivo Lara. Giménez Ochoa was one of the passengers on the controversial flight in the case known as "Delcygate" in January 2020, which stopped at Barajas Airport in Madrid, Spain.



Nicolás Ricardo

Fernández de Caleyá

He is also part of Delcy Rodríguez's circle and serves as senior director of the FUTVE League (the top division of Venezuelan professional soccer). His direct relationship with Rodríguez reveals that this official has had ties to the commercial structure of the country's elite clubs.⁵⁵



Víctor De Aldama

Spanish businessman. According to Spanish media outlets, private communications intercepted by the Spanish Civil Guard indicate that De Aldama allegedly conducted business under Rodríguez's influence and signed collaboration agreements between his club, Zamora CF, and Deportivo Lara, which was then linked to Giménez.⁵⁶

Regarding Rodríguez's connection with executives of the Major League of Professional Baseball (LMBP), although the ultimate beneficiaries of the eight teams in this league, created in 2021, are unknown, reports suggest that the real owners are powerful figures within the Vice Presidency and the National Assembly. According to sources, this league could be being used as a mechanism for laundering money from corruption.⁵⁷

51 Transparencia Venezuela. El fútbol venezolano entre un poderoso «ahijado» y varios padrinos.

<https://transparenciave.org/el-futbol-venezolano-entre-un-poderoso-ahijado-y-varios-padrinos/> 25 May 2025

52 Transparencia Venezuela. Deporte y poder en Venezuela: un lineup bajo la sombra de una camarilla aferrada al mando:

<https://transparenciave.org/deporte-y-poder-en-venezuela-un-lineup-bajo-la-sombra-de-una-camarilla-aferrada-al-mando/> 19 September 2025.

53 Transparencia Venezuela. El fútbol venezolano entre un poderoso «ahijado» y varios padrinos.

<https://transparenciave.org/el-futbol-venezolano-entre-un-poderoso-ahijado-y-varios-padrinos/> 25 May 2025

54 Transparencia Venezuela. El guante del oficialismo también captura equipos de béisbol.

<https://transparenciave.org/el-guante-del-oficialismo-tambien-captura-equipos-de-beisbol/> 6 July 2025

Analysis of Delcy Rodríguez's Network of Connections

1. Characteristics of the network

For more than a decade, various organizations have been keeping record of individuals and institutions mentioned in cases of large-scale corruption and other illegal activities originating in Venezuela. With the technological support of network analysis, this record now makes it possible to show the links between members of that network and the nodes or agents with varying degrees of control over it.

Delcy Rodríguez's network of immediate connections⁵⁸ consists of 59 nodes/agents that establish 159 interactions. This substructure expands to 1,210 nodes/agents with two degrees of separation, indicating a high capacity for indirect influence, since with three degrees of separation Delcy Rodríguez has access to 13,401 nodes/agents, that is, to almost the entire recorded network.



The first ring is **predominantly made up of Venezuelan government agencies** (ministries, state-owned companies, constitutional bodies), along with individuals who hold strategic positions or have been formally appointed, as well as nodes/agents in the private sector.

⁵¹ Refers to relationships with one degree of separation.

The immediate network with one degree of separation from Rodríguez is strongly dominated by **formal administrative relationships**, in particular by **appointments, ratifications**, and positions held, which link the central node/agent with ministries, strategic state-owned companies—such as PDVSA and CITGO until 2020—electoral and judiciary bodies, as well as extraordinary **institutional structures** such as the National Constituent Assembly.

These interactions form a dense network of control, appointment, and ratification within the state apparatus, revealing a high concentration of hierarchical and administrative ties around a single individual: Delcy Rodríguez.

Overlapping this administrative core are **interactions of a non-administrative nature, including international sanctions**, documented cases of corruption—such as the CADIVI and CLAP cases, wrongful decisions and practices of concealment, theft, or failure to submit documents—as well as **family ties**.

2. Strong indirect linkages with the private sector

Strong links were found at the second degree of relationship. Delcy Rodríguez does not appear in the record with any corporate, contractual, or formal representation relationships with private companies. The links are consistent with patterns of indirect intermediation, in which coordination with private interests is channeled through third parties (front men), family structures, political operators, or instrumentalized public entities, thereby reducing Delcy Rodríguez's direct exposure.

3. Linkage example: Yussef Abou Nassif Smaili and the Abou Nassif Group



Yussef Abou
Nassif Smaili


Two direct relations with the Abou Nassif group stand out: (i) Delcy Rodríguez's romantic relationship with Yussef Abou Nassif Smaili and (ii) that of Nabil Abou Nassif with Jorge Rodríguez, when he served as director of administration and finance in the Mayor's Office of Caracas during the tenure of Delcy Rodríguez's brother.



This cluster/subnetwork is characterized by direct corporate relationships, including the incorporation, legal representation, management, and shareholding of companies. Therefore, there is a systematic repetition of roles (director, shareholder, legal representative) held by the same family nucleus, mainly by the brothers Yussef, Samir, and Karim Abou Nassif Smaili, as well as by other individuals associated with the Abou Nassif group, whose direct family ties have not been confirmed.

Investigations by Transparencia Venezuela⁵⁹ and Armando.info⁶⁰ document that Mexico's Financial Intelligence Unit (UIF) opened investigations in 2018 into a group of companies and individuals linked to the brokerage of food for the Local Supply and Production Committees (CLAPs), identifying unusual transactions and overpricing associated with the importation of food products for the CLAP scheme, in which the Abou Nassif group was involved.

The UIF took action, froze accounts, and filed criminal actions, but the case is still in the hands of the Mexican prosecutor's office. No investigation is known to be underway in Venezuela.



59 Transparencia Venezuela. Empresas cómplices del Gobierno venezolano.

Available at: <https://transparenciave.org/empresas-complices/>

60 Armando.info. La familia, mercantil antes que política, de Delcy Rodríguez.

Available at: <https://armando.info/la-familia-mercantil-antes-que-politica-de-delcy-rodriguez/?tztc=1> 15 August 2021

This cluster/subnetwork links local companies (Venezuela) with offshore structures (Panama, Hong Kong), suggesting a design aimed at jurisdictional opacity:

	Company	Jurisdiction	Sector	Linked person	Role	Possible role in subnetwork
1	Alimentos Maco 2020, C.A.	Venezuela	Food	Jamal Abou Nassif Smaili	Proxy	Operating company in the food sector; strengthens production capacity and territorial implementation of the CLAP scheme.
2	Alimentos Plan B, C.A.	Venezuela	Food	Jamal Abou Nassif Smaili	Proxy	Operational backup company; possible contingency role for continuity of supply in the event of regulatory or contractual risks.
3	Cesta Pago, C.A.	Venezuela	Financial Services / Payments	Omar Abou Nassif Sruji	Legal representative, director, and shareholder	Critical node/financial agent; facilitates payments, intermediation, and possible circularization of funds.
4	Comercializadora Granitos y Más 2014	Venezuela	Sale of materials	Omar Abou Nassif Sruji	Legal representative	Peripheral company; sector diversification with low strategic centrality.
5	Constructora Adproin de Venezuela	Venezuela	Construction/infrastructure	Omar Abou Nassif Sruji	Partner	Sector diversification; possible use for capital absorption and non-food contracts.
6	Cor Investments International Inc	Barbados	Holding offshore	Omar Abou Nassif Sruji	Partner	Long-term financial structure; associated with banking secrecy jurisdiction.
7	Corporación Avitours, C.A.	Venezuela	Tourism / Services	Yussef Abou Nassif Smaili / Jamal Abou Nassif Smaili	Legal representative, director, and shareholder	Local node/bridge agent that anchors capital in visible and formally lawful activities.

	Company	Jurisdiction	Sector	Linked person	Role	Possible role in subnetwork
8	Corporación Yuja 18-08, C.A.	Venezuela	Marketing/ distribution	Yussef Abou Nassif Smaili / Jamal Abou Nassif Smaili	Legal representative, director, and shareholder	Family-controlled company shared with Jamal Abou Nassif Smaili; consolidates internal governance of the clan.
9	Distribuidora Loabse, C.A.	Venezuela	Distribution	Omar Abou Nassif Sruji	Legal representative, director, and shareholder	Logistics extension of the Loabse group; contract execution and internal circulation.
10	Distribuidora Yuja 2020, C.A.	Venezuela	Distribution/ supplies	Yussef Abou Nassif Smaili / Jamal Abou Nassif Smaili	Legal representative, shareholder and founder	Logistical and contractual support entity; linked to implementation of local supply.
11	Empaquetadora Ávila	Venezuela	Food / Packaging	Omar Abou Nassif Sruji	Founder / corporate affiliate	Operating company in the food sector; physical support for processing and presentation of products associated with CLAP.
12	Global Crest Limited	Offshore (unspecified)	Trade / holding	Yussef Abou Nassif Smaili	Director and shareholder	Vehicle for controlling shareholdings and retaining profits; intermediate layer between the beneficiary and the final beneficiary.
13	Grupo Freshco	Venezuela	Food marketing	Omar Abou Nassif Sruji	Founder	Local operating arm of the Freshco group; regional operation of food businesses.
14	Grupo Freshco International, S.A.	Panamá	Holding / Food	Omar Abou Nassif Sruji	Director	Offshore control platform for the Freshco block; centralizes governance and international projection.

	Company	Jurisdiction	Sector	Linked person	Role	Possible role in subnetwork
15	Grupo Undici, C.A.	Venezuela	“Premium” consumption	Yussef Abou Nassif Smaili	Linked to executives	Associated entity; integrated into the economic circuit but not a core control entity.
16	Importadora Loabse, C.A.	Venezuela	Import	Omar Abou Nassif Sruji	Legal representative	Specific vehicle for foreign trade; strengthens vertical control of supply.
17	Interbursa C.A.	Venezuela	Financial services / brokerage	Yussef Abou Nassif Smaili	Employee / corporate affiliation	Node/financial agent; potential use for payments, brokerage or placement of funds.
18	Inversiones Freshco	Venezuela	Investments / Food	Omar Abou Nassif Sruji	Founder	Complementary vehicle for channeling capital and contracts in the domestic market.
19	Loabse, C.A.	Venezuela	Marketing / Import	Omar Abou Nassif Sruji	Legal representative, director, and shareholder	Relevant node/ commercial agent; shares recurring clan partners and financial allies.
20	Luck Fortune International Trading LTD	Hong Kong	International trade / food imports	Yussef Abou Nassif Smaili /Omar Abou Nassif Sruji	Legal representative	Key instrumental company for imports associated with the CLAP scheme; possible role in billing and triangulation.
21	Maco Express 1808, C.A.	Venezuela	Food/ Logistics	Jamal Abou Nassif Smaili	Proxy	Operational extension for food product processing, transportation, and delivery.

	Company	Jurisdiction	Sector	Linked person	Role	Possible role in subnetwork
22	Mass Joy Industries Limited	Hong Kong	Import and marketing of food products	Yussef Abou Nassif Smaili	Representative	Central operating company of the CLAP scheme; frequently mentioned in journalistic investigations into government contracts.
23	Million Rise Industries Limited	Hong Kong	Food imports	Omar Abou Nassif Sruji	Legal representative	Direct supplier to the CLAP scheme; mirror company of Mass Joy Industries Limited for contractual diversification.
24	Nacort Corporation	Panamá	Holding offshore	Yussef Abou Nassif Smaili	Director	Early offshore structure; evidence of initial phases of corporate opacity.
25	Osteria (marca comercial)	Venezuela	Restaurant	Yussef Abou Nassif Smaili	Proxy	Visible asset for legitimization; aimed at normalizing income and projecting lawful activity.
26	Servicios Alservi, C.A.	Venezuela	Services / Outsourcing	Omar Abou Nassif Sruji	Legal representative, director, and shareholder	Multipurpose company; operational and contractual support for the business ecosystem.
27	Shinning Capital International Limited	Hong Kong	Holding / Corporate services	Yussef Abou Nassif Smaili / Omar Abou Nassif Sruji	Legal representative	Parallel structure used for corporate camouflage and fragmentation of financial flows.
28	Universal Lakes Corp	Panamá	Offshore Holding	Yussef Abou Nassif Smaili	Director	Mirror corporation; coincides with recurring actors in the clan's offshore ecosystem.

	Company	Jurisdiction	Sector	Linked person	Role	Possible role in subnetwork
29	Ok Mart	Venezuela	Company incorporation	Nabil Abou Nassif Sourougi	Partner / Founder	Incorporated after leaving the Mayor's Office of Caracas; rapidly expanding chain of grocery stores in Caracas.
30	Ok Mart 2	Venezuela	Company incorporation	Nabil Abou Nassif Sourougi	Partner / Founder	Part of Ok Mart's corporate structure.
31	Ok Mart 3	Venezuela	Company incorporation	Nabil Abou Nassif Sourougi	Partner / Founder	Company belonging to the same corporate group as Ok Mart.
32	Ok Mart 4	Venezuela	Company incorporation	Nabil Abou Nassif Sourougi	Partner / Founder	Continuation of the group's expansion plan.
33	Ok Mart Fly	Venezuela	Company incorporation	Nabil Abou Nassif Sourougi	Partner / Founder	Corporate variant of the Ok Mart group.
34	Ok Mart Los Palos Grandes	Venezuela	Company incorporation	Nabil Abou Nassif Sourougi	Partner / Founder	Establishment located in a strategic commercial area of Caracas.
35	Navistica C.A.	Venezuela	Founder / Shareholder	Nabil Abou Nassif Sourougi	Legal representative, director, and shareholder	Customs services company; linked to family networks of Abou Nassif.

This portfolio of companies is mainly characterized by four areas of focus:

- (i) Food
- (ii) Financial-brokerage
- (iii) Corporate camouflage
- (iv) Legitimization of front companies



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